The U.S. Department of War (DOW) recently ordered 30 U.S. universities to audit their academic, financial and research partnerships with foreign entities, and to take measures including terminating partnerships, to eliminate security risks.

The review focuses on cooperation with entities listed on the DOW's Section 1286 list. The institutions must report their findings and actions to the department by August 31 in order to "maintain eligibility for future federal research funding."

It is evident that scientific cooperation between U.S. universities and China is the primary target of this move. The DOW released an updated list of 130 foreign entities in July, 88 of which are Chinese universities and research institutions.

While the department did not name China in its press release, it said at the end of the statement that it is working in coordination with the House Select Committee on China to advance the effort.

In fact, the Pentagon's move is not a singular incident, but rather part of a broader series of actions by the U.S. to restrict scientific cooperation with China.

In May, the White House Office of Management and Budget (OMB) released a proposed rule to prohibit using federal grant funds for bilateral and multilateral collaborations with countries of concern and entities.

In July, the U.S. National Science Foundation (NSF) announced a forthcoming policy that would prohibit the use of NSF funds for collaborations with the so-called restricted entity lists maintained by the DOW and other federal agencies.

In August, the White House Office of Science and Technology Policy unveiled the National Security Science and Technology Strategy (NSSTS), which explicitly states that it will prohibit fundamental research funding to high-risk entities, including companies on the Section 1260H list of Chinese military companies operating in the U.S. It also recommends establishing processes to better track individuals and institutions that are direct and indirect recipients of federal research funding.

This is a coordinated campaign under the banner of "security." Whether it is the DOW, the White House, or the NSF, all of the documents mentioned define scientific cooperation with China-related entities as a "national security threat."

It is an overstretch of the concept of national security and politicization of normal scientific collaboration. Scientific research, particularly basic research, is inherently open and shared in nature — even U.S. export control regulations contain specific exemptions for fundamental research. The blanket restrictions on scientific cooperation with China-related entities have gone far beyond the boundaries of "national security."

The purpose behind these actions is clear. The DOW believes that such security reviews will help maintain U.S. leadership in global innovation. Similarly, the NSSTS treats the restriction of China-U.S. scientific cooperation as a key means to "remain the world's most scientifically and technologically advanced and innovative country."

There is no doubt that restricting China-U.S. scientific cooperation is detrimental to American technological development and may even accelerate the decline of U.S. scientific leadership.

The U.S. scientific community has a remarkably clear-eyed understanding of this. From May to July, the OMB solicited public comments on the proposal online and was met with overwhelming opposition from scientific organizations and researchers across disciplines.

The Association of American Universities has argued that the ban would hinder international cooperation, reduce research efficiency, make it harder for U.S. institutions to attract global talent, and ultimately undermine the national goal of maintaining U.S. scientific leadership. Steven King, a U.S. physicist, argued that the proposal would restrict international scientific collaboration and isolate American scientists, noting that the U.S. and its allies do not have a monopoly on good ideas.

Science has never been a closed domain. Open exchange and collision of ideas are inherent requirements for scientific progress. China-U.S. scientific cooperation not only advances the technological development of both countries, but also serves all humanity.

The U.S. should work together with China and others to address the scientific challenges facing humankind, rather than labeling research collaboration a "security issue" and using it as an excuse for geopolitical gamesmanship.